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CHAPTER IX
INTER SE OFFENSES
Certain status of forces treaties, including the NATO Agree-
ment, 1 in allocating jurisdiction, take into account not only the
status of the accused but also of the victim, by giving the sending
state exclusive or primary jurisdiction over inter se offenses. The
concept of an inter se offense is necessarily dual. The attitude is
reflected that if the relationship of both the accused and the
victim to the sending state is sufficiently close and to the re-
ceiving state sufficiently remote, it is appropriate to give the send-
ing state exclusive or primary jurisdiction.
The place given the concept of the inter se offense is not the
same in all the agreements. In part, this is because other con-
cepts, such as that of the on-base offense, cut across the field.
This may also be because in some agreements the fact that an
offense is inter se gives the sending state exclusive jurisdiction,
rather than only primary jurisdiction. In addition, however, it
seems that in different circumstances, different judgments have
been made regarding what relationships of the accused and of
the victim to the sending and receiving states justify invoking
the concept.
The basic issue is whether the relationship of the victim to
either state is relevant at all in allocating jurisdiction over an
offense. The passive personality principle, according to which
jurisdiction may be predicated on the nationality of the victim,
never won wide acceptance in international law.2 There is, how-
ever, a wide difference between asserting jurisdiction solely on the
1 Article VII 3(a) provides "The military authorities of the sending state
shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over a member of a
force or of a civilian component in relation to
(i) offences solely against the property or security of that State, or
offences solely against the person or property of another member of the
force or civilian component of that State or of a dependent."
8 Supra, page 13.
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ground that the victim is a national of the state and taking the
nationality of the victim into account as one factor among many
in allocating jurisdiction.
The interest of a state in whose territory an offense occurs is
in fact influenced by the nationality of the victim. This has not
led to any general limitation of the territorial principle. It has,
however, been reflected in the accepted rules or in the practice
in resolving some jurisdictional conflicts where a state other than
the territorial state has a legitimate basis for claiming concurrent
jurisdiction. Some states have limited their assertion of jurisdic-
tion under the nationality principle to cases in which the victim
was also a national. 3 The clearest case, however, of weighing
the relative closeness of the victim to the sending and receiving
state has been where an offense was committed on a merchant
vessel in a foreign port. If the peace of the port is not disturbed
and the victim is a fellow member of the crew, then, even though
he may be a national of the littoral state, the flag state is, in
practice, given primary jurisdiction. Where, however, the victim
is a stranger to the vessel (which normally means he is a national
of the littoral state) jurisdiction is exercised by the littoral
state. 4 It has been suggested that the same distinction should be
made where an offense is committed on a warship in a foreign
port. 5 No such rule has been urged with respect to offenses on
shore—all offenses are subject to the jurisdiction of the littoral
state, regardless of the relationship of the victim to either state,
except, perhaps, on-duty offenses by a member of a warship's
crew. But the littoral state has in practice often drawn the same
line, waiving its prior claim to jurisdiction where the victim was
a fellow member of the crew. 6 Where both the accused and the
victim were members of the crews of warships, the littoral state
has waived its jurisdiction, even where the offense was murder. 7
Where visiting land forces were concerned, the United Kingdom,
although it claimed concurrent jurisdiction, normally did not
exercise jurisdiction where the victim was also a member of the
8 Supra, page 11.
* Supra, page 51.
6 Supra, page 68.
8 Supra, page 75.
T See the incident cited by Colombos, op. cit. supra, p. 74, note 30, at
203-204.
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visiting force. There is evidence that this attitude has general
support.8
This is not to say that the territorial state is interested in
exercising jurisdiction only when the victim is its national. There
are many policy reasons which prompt states to assert jurisdic-
tion on the territorial principle. One, but only one, is to protect
its own nationals by punishing those who injure them or their
property, In balancing those reasons against the considerations
which support giving at least primary jurisdiction to the sending
state over visiting forces, the fact the victim is a member of the
visiting force, rather than a national of the receiving state, may,
however, tip the scale.
It has been said that to grant exclusive or primary jurisdic-
tion to the sending state over inter se offenses constitutes a
8 During the debate on the United States of America (Visiting Forces)
Act, 1942, Mr. Henderson said : "I can understand the desire of the American
Government for exclusive jurisdiction, and of course no question arises so
far as that is concerned with their own subjects and with crimes against
the person and property of other Americans. But when we come to deal
with crimes against British subjects, then at once we enter into a very
difficult field, where it is very necessary that we should think out how
friction can be avoided and how any feeling that there has been partiality
or unfairness can be prevented. * * *" 382 H.C. Deb., (5th ser.) 909 (1942).
In the debate on the Bill to implement the NATO Agreement, several
members expressed the same attitude. Thus, Mr. Fletcher said : "I can see a
considerable amount of force in the argument that where an offence is
committed against a member of a foreign force, in this country, or against
the property of a foreign force, it may be well that in those cases the
foreign service court should have jurisdiction. But the case is totally
different where the offense is committed not against a foreigner or his
country but against a British subject. It is that class of case which is really
causing the greatest concern among those who are troubled about this Bill.
Therefore, I would like to exclude from Clause 3 any offense committed
against a British subject, even though it is committed in the course of
duty by a member of a foreign force." 505 H.C. Deb. (5th ser.) 1158, (1952).
See also the comments of Mr. Stewart, id., at 1161, and of Mr. Strachey,
id., at 578 (1952), and the instances cited, infra, p. 223, where immunity
for offenses committed in performance of duty was objected to because it
would apply where the victim was a national of the receiving state.
See, however, Rex v. Nauratil, England, High Court, Warwick Assizes,
March 11, 1942, [1919-1942] Ann. Dig. (Supp. Vol.) 161 (No. 85), in
which Cassels, J. said: "It is said I ought to take into consideration the
fact that only Czechoslovak soldiers and citizens are concerned in that matter,
which, in fact, arose within the lines of the camp. I cannot say that there
is a tremendous force in that argument. * * *"
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modern form of extraterritoriality, granted to protect the indi-
vidual offender rather than his state. 9 It is submitted that this
comes too near to saying that the territorial principle is rooted
in, or itself embodies, a single rather than a complex of policy
considerations, opposed, where armed forces are concerned, by a
single functional basis for overriding the territorial principle and
granting immunity. Allocating jurisdiction over visiting forces
involves balancing a whole complex of interests of both states.
Specifically, it can be said that there is always some basis for
according immunity to a member of a visiting force, even for a
private act against a stranger to the force. The basis may, in
some situations, be compelling; in others, particularly when it is
in itself relatively weak, it may be outweighed by conflicting in-
terests of the receiving state. The fact that immunity is denied
when the victim is a national of the receiving state does not
imply that there is no basis for the immunity, but merely that
it is not sufficiently compelling. By the same token, the fact
the immunity is granted only when the victim is a member of the
military community does not mean the immunity lacks a func-
tional basis. No one would deny that the desire to protect the
individuals in its armed forces from the jurisdiction of foreign
courts has added vigor to the demands of sending states for im-
munity. This does not mean it has alone motivated those de-
mands.
• "The other category of offenses as to which the receiving state is denied
primary jurisdiction consists of crimes committed by a member of the armed
forces against persons forming part of the military community. It is diffi-
cult to associate this qualified immunity with the need of protecting the
sending state in its sovereign functions. It is true that jurisdiction over
these offenses may assist the military authorities of the sending state to
maintain discipline, but why should the dividing line between the jurisdic-
tion to maintain discipline be drawn on the basis of the nationality of the
victim and the calling he pursues? Candor compels one to admit that this
primary jurisdiction over offenses committed against other members of the
military community is a modern form of extraterritoriality. * * *******
"The concession to the sending state of primary jurisdiction over offenses
committed within the military community and, to a much more limited ex-
tent, over offenses committed while the individual is in the performance of
official duties thus appears to be grounded in a desire to protect the in-
dividual, rather than the state." R.R. Baxter, "Jurisdiction Over Visiting
Forces and the Development of International Law," 52 Proceedings Am.
Soc'y Int'l L. 174, 175-176 (1958).
189
The NATO Agreement gives a measure of immunity to mem-
bers of the visiting force and to the civilian component but not to
dependents. An offense can be inter se only if committed by a
member of the force or the civilian component. An offense by a
member of either group is, however, inter se if it is committed
against a member of the force or of the civilian component or a
dependent. The record is not clear as to why the distinction was
made. Possibly there is reflected the desire to protect a member
of the visiting force or civilian component but not a dependent.
More probably, there was thought to be a persuasive reason for
giving primary jurisdiction to the sending state over members of
its military forces and civilian components. That reason was
thought to be sufficiently compelling when the victim was a
dependent, as well as when he was a member of the visiting
force or the civilian component, but not strong enough to prevail
when he was a stranger to the force. At the same time it was
felt—as it consistently could be—that there was never a sufficient
basis for giving treaty status to a dependent, regardless of the
status of the victim.10
The revised Leased Bases Agreement and Bahama Islands
Agreement are particularly interesting because the phrase used
to describe inter se offenses is "United States interest offences." n
10
It may be urged that if this was the approach of the NATO negotiators,
they should, to be consistent, have denned the civilian component in two
different ways, eliminating the limitation excluding nationals of the re-
ceiving state in denning those members of the civilian component an
offense against whom would be within the community, since the limitation
does not appear in the definition of dependents, which is relevant only for
this purpose. Two answers suggest themselves: (1) The failure to make
the distinction may be an accident of draftsmanship of the type that is
inevitable in a tightly drafted series of interlocking clauses; (2) A de-
pendent, even though a national of the receiving state, is much more a mem-
ber of the military community than a member of the civilian component, e.g.,
an employee of the PX or Naval Exchange, who is a national of the re-
ceiving state.
11 Article IV (9) (f) of the revised Leased Bases Agreement reads:
"(f) 'United States interest offense' means an offense which (ex-
cluding the general interest of the Government of the Territory in
the maintenance of law and order therein) is solely against the in-
terests of the Government of the United States of America or against
any person (not being a British subject or local alien) or property (not
being property of a British subject or local alien) present in the Terri-
tory by reason only of service or employment in connexion with the
190
The phrase is apt in suggesting the motives for the use of the
concept. The concept is, however, given a relatively limited
place in these agreements, perhaps because jurisdiction is allo-
cated largely with reference to whether an offense was com-
mitted on or off a Leased Area or Site and because the agree-
ments do not provide for a primary right to exercise jurisdiction
where there is concurrent jurisdiction. It is, however, the basis
for according the United States exclusive jurisdiction in two
situations. If a state of war does not exist, the United States
has exclusive jurisdiction over security offenses and over United
States interest offenses committed inside a Leased Area or Site
by a member of its forces. 12 This is the only situation in which,
in peacetime, the fact that the offense is inter se is relevant. If
an offense is committed outside a Leased Area or Site by a mem-
ber of the American forces or anywhere by a member of the
civilian component, the allegiance of the victim is irrelevant. If,
on the other hand, a state of war exists, the United States has
exclusive jurisdiction over members of the American forces for
any offense and also is given exclusive jurisdiction over security
offenses and United States interest offenses committed within a
Leased Area or Site if the accused is "not a member of a United
States force, a British subject or a local alien, but is a person
subject to United States military or naval law." 13
These agreements parallel the NATO Agreement in delineating
the classes to which an accused must belong before jurisdiction
may be claimed by the sending state on the ground the offense
was inter se, even to excluding members of the civilian component
who are nationals of the receiving state. They differ in fixing the
classes to which the victim must belong before an offense can be
classified as inter se, excluding dependents. 14
construction, maintenance, operation or defense of the Bases."
The phrase "British subject" is denned in (a) of the same paragraph to
exclude a member of the United States force, but not of the civilian
component. See Article V(9) (c) and Article 1(6) of the Bahama Islands
Agreement.
"Article IV (1) (a) (ii) of the Leased Bases Agreement and Article
V(l) (a) (ii) of the Bahama Islands Agreement. The Agreement with the
Federation of the West Indies is, however, substantially the same as the
NATO Agreement. See Article IX (3), and Article I.
18 Article IV(l)(c)(i) of the Leased Bases Agreement and Article
V(l) (c) (i) of the Bahama Islands Agreement.
14 Articles cited note 11, supra.
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One may speculate regarding the reasons for setting the par-
ticular limits which define a United States interest offense and
prescribe the relevance of the concept in these Agreements. The
fact that the United States is given exclusive jurisdiction over
on-base offenses by a member of the civilian component if com-
mitted against a member of its forces or the civilian component
in time of war, but not in time of peace, strongly supports the
view that the basis for the immunity is functional, that is, stems
from military exigency. A state may be interested in protecting
the individuals in its service from the jurisdiction of foreign
courts, but it is not likely to be more interested in doing so in
time of war than in time of peace. There is, however, a greater
functional basis for claiming immunity in time of war.
The Philippines Agreement, to an even greater degree than the
revised Leased Bases Agreement, allocates jurisdiction according
to whether the offense was committed within or outside a base.
The United States has virtually exclusive jurisdiction over all
on-base offenses; hence there is no room for the concept of the
inter se offense. (It is worth reminding oneself at this point,
however, that the on-base concept is closely related to the concept
of the inter se offense.) The Philippines Agreement, nevertheless,
exempts from this grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the United
States offenses "where the offender and offended parties are both
Philippine citizens (not members of the armed forces of the
United States on active duty) ." 15 This clause recognizes partially
the interest of the receiving state in punishing those who offend
against its citizens—an interest which is more completely recog-
nized in other agreements. The Philippines object to their Agree-
ment precisely because the recognition of this interest is partial,
and jurisdiction is not accorded to the Philippines in all cases
of private acts against Philippine nationals. It may be the
Philippines would not object to an agreement which gave the
same recognition to the concept of an inter se offense as does
the NATO Agreement.
On the other hand, the Philippines Agreement does give a role,
though a very limited role, to the concept in allocating jurisdic-
tion over off-base offenses. The United States is given exclusive
jurisdiction over "any offense committed outside the bases by any
member of the armed forces of the United States in which the
18 Article XIII, 1(c).
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offended party is also a member of the armed forces of the United
States." 16 The fact that an off-base offense by a member of the
armed forces is against a member of the civilian component or a
dependent does not give the United States jurisdiction. Neither
does the United States have jurisdiction over an off-base offense
committed by a member of the civilian component or a dependent
against a member of the armed forces or of the civilian com-
ponent or a dependent. 17
The Agreement with Libya in this respect contrasts markedly
with the Philippine Agreement. The United States has exclusive
jurisdiction over "members of the United States forces" for
"offenses committed solely within the agreed areas" and for
"offenses solely against the property of the Government of the
United States of America, or against the person or property of
another member of the United States forces." 18 The phrase
"United States forces" is, however, defined in such broad terms 19
that an offense by a member of the armed forces or of the
civilian component or a dependent against a person in any of
these groups (excluding Libyan nationals), wherever committed,
falls under American jurisdiction. The situation with respect to
on-base offenses, on the other hand, parallels that in the Philip-
pines.20
Reid v. Covert and its companion cases 21 have not changed the
"Article XIII, 1(b).
17 The Agreement contemplates that the local fiscal (prosecuting attorney)
may waive jurisdiction in these and other cases, in which event the United
States is free to exercise jurisdiction. See Article XIII, 4.
18 Article XX (1) (b) and (a).
19 " 'United States forces' includes personnel belonging to the armed
services of the United States of America and accompanying civilian person-
nel who are employed by or serving with such services (including the de-
pendents of such military and civilian personnel), who are not nationals of,
nor ordinarily resident in Libya; and who are in the territory of Libya in
connection with operations under the present Agreement." Article XXVIII.
20 The allocation of jurisdiction under the Agreement with the Dominican
Republic resembled that under the Libyan Agreement. The United States
had exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses committed in the Republic by
members of the United States forces and others subject to United States
military law, except Dominican nationals or local aliens. The one exception
was with respect to offenses committed outside the sites against a Dominican
national or local alien; in such cases, the Mixed Military Commission de-
cided who should exercise jurisdiction. Article XV (1) (a) and (b).
81 Supra, p. 157, note 2.
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reach of the concept of the inter se offense. It is true that if the
accused is not a member of the armed forces, an American court-
martial cannot exercise jurisdiction, even though the offense is
inter se, e.g., by a member of the civilian component against a
dependent. If the accused is a member of the armed forces, how-
ever, and the victim is either a member of the civilian component
or a dependent, the offense is still inter se under the NATO
Agreement.22 The same is true under the other agreements in
which the concept is used. An offense by a member of the armed
forces is still inter se, even though the victim is of a class over
which a United States court-martial can no longer exercise juris-
diction.
The agreements discussed suggest that, while the role assigned
the concept of the inter se offense has varied, there is general
agreement that it has a place in allocating jurisdiction.23 One
should not, however, overestimate the reach of any of the provi-
sions incorporating the concept. A series of acts, or even a single
act, against a member of the military community may also offend
against a distinct and discernible, if not vital, interest of the re-
ceiving state.24 The suggestion has been made 25 that, under the
NATO Agreement, where the offenses are of roughly equal
22 If the United States had, in the NATO negotiations, succeeded in its
effort to have used the combined term, "contingent," defined as those subject
to the military laws of the United States, the result of Reid v. Covert
would have been to narrow the scope of the treaty language.
28 Some of the agreements, including the NATO Agreement, include in
the concept offenses against the property or security of the sending state or
against the property as well as the person of a member of the military com-
munity. It seems unnecessary to discuss these provisions in detail. If the
concept is valid where an offense is against a person, a fortiori it is valid
where an offense is against the property or the security of the sending
state, since the interest of the receiving state in punishing offenses of this
nature is presumably less than in punishing offenses against a person.
24 Snee and Pye, Status of Forces Agreement: Criminal Jurisdiction 55-7
(1957). The authors cite the Buxton case, ACM 8708, 16 CMR 732, in which
the accused, a member of the United States forces, stole pistols belonging
to the United States and sold them to Moroccans. The French agreed that
under the French Moroccan Agreement (classified) the United States had
primary jurisdiction with respect to the larceny, but claimed primary juris-
diction over the offense of illegal trafficking in arms. The authors note also
that an assault may be considered as a breach of the peace and therefore
not solely against the victim, and a sexual offense one against public
decency as well as against the person.
"Snee and Pye, op. cit. supra, note 24, at 57.
194
gravity, each state should exercise jurisdiction over the offense
regarding which it has the primary right, but that where one is
of distinctly greater gravity, only the state having the primary
right with respect to that offense should exercise jurisdiction.
Under the NATO Agreement the fact that an offense is within
the military community gives the sending state only primary, not
exclusive jurisdiction. The word "primary" presumably means
priority in time. The fact that one state has the primary right to
exercise jurisdiction hence suspends, rather than eliminates, the
concurrent but secondary right of the other state.26 Theoretically,
then, recognition of a primary right in one state and its exercise
may create a problem under the double jeopardy provision.27 It
may be that in this context the approach to the multiple offense
problem should be as technically nice as that which normally
characterizes the handling of double jeopardy problems. It would,
however, seem more in keeping with the spirit of the NATO
Agreement to interpret broadly the provision giving primary
jurisdiction to the sending state over inter se offenses. The re-
ceiving state can, after all, later assert its secondary jurisdiction
in the unlikely event that the action taken by the sending state is
unsatisfactory, and in this case the double jeopardy provision
may well not be a bar.
The shape of the problem is somewhat different where the send-
ing state is granted exclusive jurisdiction over inter se offenses.
A stricter interpretation of what constitutes such an offense may,
in this context, be in order. Perhaps drawing a line in terms of
the place of the offense—whether on-base or off-base, as the
"Labelle v. Zerfoss, No. 254/1954 (Cour de Cassation, 7 Mar. 1957),
affirming Gadois v. Zerfoss (Cour d'Appel de Paris, 14 Dec. 1953), 81
Journal du droit international 737 (1954), summarized in Snee and Pye,
op. cit. supra, note 24, at 69-70.
27 In the Whitley case (Cour de Cassation, 25 March 1958) which arose
when a car being driven by a Major in the USAF was involved in an acci-
dent which caused the death of a passenger, a Canadian officer, the court
held, reversing the Cour d'Appel de Paris, that where France had waived
its primary jurisdiction and the United States authorities had, after a
thorough investigation, determined not to try the accused, a joint criminal-
civil action by the widow of the victim was barred. It can be argued that the
same rule should apply where a state has the primary right to proceed by
the Agreement. A waiver is, however, an affirmative act, and the language
of Art. VII 3(c) is "If the State having the primary right decides not to
exercise jurisdiction," language apt for expressing the idea of final rather
than temporary surrender.
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Philippines Agreement in effect to a degree does—has real merit.
The line need not mark a complete break, completely excluding
the utilization of the concept where the offense is off-base. Where,
however, the offense is both inter se and on-base, it can be looked
upon as one within the military community, which is separate
enough so that an inter se offense committed there does not
seriously disturb the "peace of the port." 28 The parenthetical
clause in the definition of "United States interest offense" in the
revised Leased Bases Agreement, "excluding the general interest
of the Government of the Territory in the maintenance of law
and order therein" suggests the added interests, other than the
protection of the territorial state's nationals, which lie behind
the territorial principle. It is significant that the receiving state
was prepared expressly to waive those interests in an agreement
which limited the reach of the inter se concept to on-base offenses.
The significance accorded the inter se concept in status of
forces agreements is perhaps surprising in view of the limited
significance given to it in the traditional analysis of the bases of
jurisdiction. The allocation of jurisdiction over merchant sea-
men with respect to offenses committed on board ship in a
foreign port does, however, provide a precedent. The actual
practice of states with respect to offenses by the crews of war-
ships on shore furnishes another. Much comment suggests, more-
over, that much greater importance is in fact attached to the
status of the victim than to the place of the offense. It may well
be that the territorial principle owes much more to the fact that
the victim is usually a national of the territorial state than is
commonly assumed. In any case, the inter se concept seems
clearly to be an acceptable basis for according a limited im-
28 A most interesting provision reflecting these ideas is that in Procedural
Agreement No. 16 to the 26 September 1953 Agreements with Spain. Para-
graph 7 reads: "Whenever a member of the United States Forces commits
an offense solely against the property of the United States or solely against
the property or person of another member of the United States Forces and
the offense is committed on a military reservation in an area which is under
the control of a United States 'Commander,' the offender will, if he is
apprehended by Spanish military police, immediately be turned over into the
custody of United States military authorities for disciplinary action. No
report of the offense will be made to the Mixed Commission or Jurisdiction
and the United States 'Commander's' disposition of the case shall be final
and binding on all concerned * *."
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munity from the jurisdiction of the receiving state to visiting
armed forces.29
29 Section 62 of the Restatement, Foreign Relations Law, p. 194, states
that "(1) Except as otherwise expressly indicated by the territorial state,
its consenting to the presence of a foreign force within its territory * * *
implies that it agrees that the sending state shall have the prior right to
exercise enforcement within the territory over members of the force with
respect to********
(b) an offense committed by a member of the force that affects only the
force or its members and does not involve the public order of the terri-
torial state."
See also Comment d to Section 62 at 195.
The position taken seems eminently reasonable, but it may be doubted that
there is any established rule to this effect.
